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National policies must be in the interest of all Canadians. Between the 1920s and 
1940s when the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) was first being constructed, the export 
of wheat from the prairies was an essential component of national policy. In the 
twenty-first century the CWB has no important role in the development policy of 
western Canada. Its objectives are totally aimed at earning premiums in the market for 
prairie farmers. The CWB controls a smaller volume of the prairie crop in 2005 than it 
did in 1948. Given this diminished role for the CWB, does it need to exist at all? How 
might it be changed in a transformative way, given the present day realities of trade 
agreements and domestic pressures, so that it operates in the national interest while 
still maximizing returns for prairie wheat and barley farmers?    
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Introduction
 
ational policies must be in the interest of all Canadians. Between the 1920s and 
1940s when the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) was first being constructed, the 
export of wheat from the prairies was an essential component of national policy 
(Fowke, 1957). Another important piece of national policy that affected the prairie 
wheat economy was the Crowsnest Freight Rate, which gave farmers protection from 
increasing freight rates for export grains. In this context the CWB made sense. By the 
1990s, the export of wheat and barley was not an essential part of national policy in 
Canada. In 1995, the Government of Canada removed the transportation subsidy for 
export grains. Following the Canada–United States Trade Agreement (1989) and the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (1995), Canada has promoted free trade in 
all agricultural commodities with the exceptions of supply-managed commodities and 
the export of wheat and barley through the state trader (i.e., the CWB). Some argue 
that the continued existence of the CWB in its present form is a hindrance to 
achieving national policy objectives because it is a trade irritant for our largest trading 
partners. 
In the twenty-first century the CWB has no important role in the development 
policy of western Canada. Its objectives are totally aimed at earning premiums in the 
market for prairie farmers. Canadian consumers are not affected by the continued 
existence of the CWB (for example through higher bread prices) because Canada 
allows for the import of both wheat and barley by millers, malt houses, and feed users. 
Given this diminished role for the CWB, does it need to exist at all? How might it be 
changed, given the present day realities of trade agreements and domestic pressures, 
so that it operates in the national interest while still maximizing returns for prairie 
wheat and barley farmers? The purpose of this article is to examine these questions.   
Part I: The Current Situation 
The perceived problem 
There are at least two perceived problems with the current structure of the CWB. The 
first concern is associated with the historical development of the CWB, specifically, 
why does the single-desk authority apply only to wheat and barley? The second 
concern is with how the CWB fits into Canada’s future trade strategy. This section of 
the article gives a thumbnail sketch of the roots of these two concerns. 
When the CWB was first put together, wheat, oats, and barley were the primary 
grains grown by prairie farmers. When canola (originally rapeseed) and pulse crops 
(e.g., peas and lentils) were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, farmers 
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chose to leave the marketing of these crops outside the CWB. The result is a mixed 
marketing system, and while it is an irritant to some prairie producers it is not a trade 
concern. 
The second concern is more serious because it relates to Canada’s trade options. 
The CWB is a state trading enterprise with some special powers granted to it by the 
federal government. Two such special powers of the CWB are 1) single-desk selling 
authority for wheat, durum, and barley produced in the CWB “area” and sold for 
domestic human consumption or into the export market and 2) the “pool account” 
guarantee. The region over which the CWB has regulatory power consists of the three 
Canadian Prairie provinces and the Peace River region of British Columbia. There are 
producer benefits from the CWB, some of which are price premiums earned in some 
markets, simplicity of pricing, no issue over receiving payments for delivered grain 
(the CWB always pays farmers for grain at time of delivery), and some transportation 
benefits.
1 
An initial payment is paid to farmers by the CWB when they deliver their grain to 
the elevator (Schmitz and Furtan, 1999). The initial payment is the first installment of 
the final price received by the grain farmer. The final price is determined after all sales 
for the marketing year have been made. The funds to make the initial payment are 
drawn from one of the four “pool accounts” which the CWB creates for each 
marketing year.
2 
The single-desk selling powers are required to make the pool accounts 
sustainable.
3 The CWB makes annual forecasts for wheat and barley sales and prices. 
Once the CWB can approximate how much grain it has to sell for the year (i.e., once 
the crop is planted), it can make a reasonable estimate of what farmers will receive for 
their grain at the elevator. The initial payment is usually set at approximately 70–75 
percent of what the CWB forecasts will be the final price for grain. Farmers receive a 
pooled price for their grain that depends upon the class, grade, and protein of the grain 
delivered, and the farmer’s location, less CWB marketing and administration costs.
4 
The fact that it has single-desk selling authority guarantees the CWB management all 
of the wheat, durum, and barley produced in the CWB area that is sold into the 
domestic human-consumption or the export market. (Barley and wheat can be sold by 
farmers into the domestic animal-feed market outside the CWB.) This restriction on 
marketing grain serves two purposes: 1) it ensures that if an importer wants Canadian 
wheat, durum, or barley they must buy it from a single seller (i.e., the CWB), which 
may charge a higher price than if the market were competitive and 2) it allows the 
CWB to enter long-term sales contracts without having to use the futures market.
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For certain, not all farmers see the current CWB price pooling scheme as a 
benefit. Some farmers would choose to operate outside the existing system but have 
not been allowed to do so by the federal government.
6 In fact some prairie farmers 
were willing to go to prison for marketing their own grain into U.S. markets as a 
demonstration of their opposition to the single-desk selling authority of the CWB. 
The CWB is under pressure from some members of the World Trade Organization 
to change some of its operational procedures. The WTO framework agreement cited at 
least two issues its members have with the current operations of the CWB.
7 First, the 
WTO has some concern around the operation of the CWB pool account guarantee and 
the role of government financing.
8 When the pool account goes into deficit, the federal 
government must pay the CWB an amount equal to the deficit. The “initial price”, or 
pool account guarantee, is set by the federal government following a recommendation 
by the CWB. The pool account for wheat has incurred deficits four times since 1950, 
in crop years 1968-69, 1985-86, 1990-91, and 2002-03.
9 It is this guarantee that that 
the WTO wants removed. The proposal to remove the pool account guarantee is now 
on the negotiating table and may be accepted by the Canadian government. Second, 
the WTO framework agreement suggested that the single-desk selling authority of the 
CWB needs to be examined. Some member countries of the WTO are seeking changes 
to the powers of exporting state trading enterprises such as the CWB. The Canadian 
government is resisting the pressure to place this issue on the negotiating table. 
In addition, the CWB has been challenged with unfair trade practices by the 
United States a total of 12 times (14 if you count the CVD/AD on hard red 
spring/durum wheat as 4) for different reasons and through different channels. In 
2003, the United States brought a formal complaint to the WTO against Canada. One 
element of the complaint challenged the CWB, claiming it was not operating in 
accordance with Article XVII of the GATT 1994. In April of 2004, the WTO panel 
established to hear the U.S. complaint rejected the U.S. argument that the CWB 
violated its obligations set out in Article XVII. The United States appealed the panel’s 
findings with respect to the CWB. 
In 2002, the United States Department of Commerce initiated countervailing and 
antidumping investigations on imports of Canadian hard red spring and durum wheat. 
In most of the previous U.S. challenges the CWB was found not to be in violation; 
however, the 2003 result was different. As a result of the 2003 challenge, the United 
States government imposed a countervailing duty of 5.29 percent and an antidumping 
duty of 8.87 percent on hard red spring wheat imports from Canada (CWB, 2005).
10 
As no injury was found on durum imports from Canada, no tariff was placed on 
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attributable to the government guarantees, is being appealed by the Canadian 
government, along with the CWB and the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, to a 
NAFTA panel. In addition, the CWB is appealing the U.S. International Trade 
Commission’s ruling of injury on hard red spring to a NAFTA panel.  
Just how important is the CWB to prairie farmers? 
A number of studies have demonstrated that the CWB does earn a premium in some 
world markets, such as the Japanese wheat market and the domestic malt barley 
market (Furtan et al., 1999; Schmitz et al.,1997; Wilson and Gallagher, 1990). These 
premiums are a direct result of the single-desk selling authority of the CWB. The 
Australian Wheat Board (AWB) makes the same claim for Australian wheat in some 
markets and for the same reason. The AWB has single-desk selling authority for the 
export of wheat from Australia into foreign markets but has no single-desk authority 
in the domestic market. 
Farmers have a direct say on the board of directors of the CWB. With ten of the 
fifteen board members elected by farmers, the senior management is responsive to the 
demands of farmers. As the number of co-operative grain companies has declined on 
the prairies, farmer control of the CWB has become more important. This influence 
over the CWB is one part of the grain handling system where the farmer’s voice has 
increased over the past ten years. 
Wheat as a crop has declined in economic importance to prairie farmers. Wheat 
revenue as a percentage of total farm income has declined from 78 percent in 1950 to 
just under 40 percent in 2002 (figure 1). Over the past 30 years the crops that have 
increased in economic importance to farmers are canola, feed barley, and pulse crops. 
Interestingly, all these crops are outside the CWB. The malt barley market, which has 
increased from 1.216 million tonnes over the period 1987–92 to 2.244 million tonnes 
in 1997–2002, is under the CWB; however, the majority of the growth in barley sales 
has been in the animal-feed market. The feed barley market operates largely outside of 
the CWB. The increased reliance of the CWB on wheat revenues is shown in figure 2. 
The result of these trends is that the CWB is not as economically important to prairie 
farmers as it once was. 
   W.H. Furtan 

























































Figure 1: Percentage of prairie grain income made up of wheat, 1950-2003 














































































Figure 2: Wheat sales as share of CWB revenue: 1950 to 2003 
Source: Canadian Wheat Board 
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Part II: An Alternative Situation 
f demands by members of the WTO and/or U.S. or domestic pressures result in a 
change to the pool account guarantee and a relaxing of the single-desk selling 
authority, what options does the CWB have to continue in the grain business? (A host 
of other issues that merit investigation would arise with any change to the CWB, for 
example, the implications for the grain transportation sector; however, these issues are 
well beyond the scope of this article.) 
A farmer-funded guarantee 
The most obvious alternative to the government guarantee is for farmers to purchase 
insurance or to self-insure. Given the infrequent occurrence of the pool account 
deficit, the cost of insurance would be very low. Large insurance companies would 
supply this service for a fee. Alternatively, farmers could build up an account from a 
grain check-off to cover any deficit that occurred, i.e., they could self-insure. 
This option would be most attractive to the federal government, because it would 
be rid of a contingent liability for no cost. However, farmers are most likely to lobby 
for an alternative policy that provides some economic protection at government 
expense. If the guarantee on the pool account is to be removed it could be replaced 
with a loan rate scheme that mirrors the support for U.S. farmers.
11 
A loan rate scheme for Canadian wheat farmers 
The American loan rate is set in the U.S. Farm Bill and is fixed over the life of the 
bill. It puts a floor on the price of the commodity in question. There are loan rates for 
a long list of commodities, including, among others, wheat, barley, corn, and 
soybeans. If the price of the commodity falls below the loan rate a deficiency payment 
is made to the farmer. This is not substantially different in purpose from the 
guaranteed pool account; however, the U.S. loan rate on wheat is binding more often 
than the pool account guarantee and thus has paid out much more to U.S. wheat 
producers.
12 
With a loan rate scheme the Canadian government would make a payment to 
wheat farmers whenever the price the farmer receives is below the loan rate. The price 
at which the loan rate is set will determine the magnitude of the government expense. 
If the Canadian government set the loan rate to exactly mirror the U.S. loan rate, 
Canadian wheat farmers would have exactly the same floor price as American 
farmers.
13  
The cost to government of a loan program for Canadian wheat farmers would not 
be as large as it first appears because program substitution economies would occur. 
Any support money paid to Canadian wheat farmers under the loan rate policy would 
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be counted as farm income and would reduce other farm income support payouts 
required.
14 The current federal-provincial agreement on farm income support is called 
the Canadian Agriculture Income Support program (CAIS). This program is designed 
to stabilize the five-year moving average of the “eligible net margin” of farms.
15 This 
program has some similarity to the additional U.S. farm programs, such as disaster 
relief programs.  
Removal of all CWB single-desk selling authority 
Any WTO-negotiated removal of the single-desk selling authority from the CWB will 
occur a long way in the future, if ever. The more likely case is that the single-desk 
selling authority will be removed through a change to the Canadian Wheat Board Act 
undertaken by the Government of Canada for some domestic reason. For example, the 
Conservative Party clearly identified removal of the single-desk authority of the CWB 
as part of its farm policy platform in the 2004 general election.  
The most drastic response to the pressure for change to the CWB would be the 
removal of its single-desk selling authority in all markets and for all commodities. 
This would make Canada a free trader in all grains. However, it would also mean the 
CWB would disappear, and with it any ability of producers to have a farmer-
controlled marketing agency that could price discriminate in the world grain market. 
With a complete loss of the single-desk selling authority the CWB would not be 
able to operate a pool account as it does currently because it would have no control 
over the farm marketing of Canadian wheat and barley supplies. If grain prices were 
to start to increase within the marketing year, farmers would have an incentive not to 
sell their grain through the CWB. This would lower the average pooled price because 
only the lower-valued sales would be in the pool account. If prices were to fall over 
the marketing year, farmers would have the incentive to sell into the pool account. 
Thus, farmers would be in the position of having to decide whether to market their 
grain through the CWB or on their own, depending upon which way they anticipate 
prices will move over the crop year. 
The CWB would be limited in its ability to enter into long-term contracts with 
foreign buyers, because farmers might deliver their grain to other marketers who 
operate outside the pool account. The CWB would be forced to operate like a grain 
company and sell on a margin, i.e., the difference between the export price and the 
price paid to farmers. It would have little choice but to become another grain company 
offering marketing services to farmers. Even this outcome is highly unlikely because 
currently the CWB does not own assets like terminals and inland delivery points. 
The Canadian government could choose to make a payout to existing wheat 
farmers as compensation for the loss of the single-desk selling authority. A similar   W.H. Furtan 
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policy option was used by the Government of Canada in 1996 when a portion of the 
Crow Benefit
16 was paid to farmers in the CWB region in the form of a one-time 
acreage payment, and by the Government of the United States when U.S. peanut and 
tobacco farmers lost their production quotas. It has also been raised as a possible 
option with respect to the removal of Canadian supply-management production 
quotas.  
One option in the event of complete removal of the single-desk selling authority is 
to transform the CWB from a marketing board for farmers into a co-operative grain 
company. The personnel of the CWB understand the world market; given a transition 
period and some financial assistance, the organization may be positioned to compete 
very successfully in world grain markets – as it has been doing for the past 60 years.  
The new grain company would require some grain assets, which could be 
purchased with a loan from the federal government. Rather than pay out farmers for 
the loss of the CWB single desk, the government could make such a loan to assist in 
the transition. If farmers are to give up a price premium, the federal government could 
make funds in lieu of the forgone premium available to the CWB for the transition.  
This option is not with out risk. How does one know if the new company would 
be able to pay back the loan? Recently, co-operative grain companies have not done 
well in Canada. Both the Alberta and Manitoba co-operative grain companies have 
been amalgamated with United Grain Growers to form Agricore United Inc. In 2005 
the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool completely removed its co-operative structure in favor 
of a traditional business structure. Stiff competition from large multinational grain 
companies with deep pockets would occur. 
Removal of some CWB single-desk selling authority 
At least two options for the partial removal of the single-desk selling authority are 
worthy of consideration. The first option would be to re-create the continental barley 
market while maintaining the single-desk authority for hard red spring and durum 
wheat. In the run-up to the 1993 general election the federal government created a 
continental barley market by allowing for the export of Canadian barley to the United 
States through agencies other than the CWB. A court challenge lead by the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool got the policy overturned. Before the government could 
further amend the CWB legislation they were defeated in a general election. The new 
Liberal government did not re-introduce the amendments to the Canadian Wheat 
Board Act so the continental barley market did not become permanent. 
The continental barley market option still exists. However, barley exports into the 
United States are low and have not created any trade tension since 1993. Removing 
the designation of the CWB as the sole seller of Canadian barley to the United States   W.H. Furtan 
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would appease only those domestic farmers who want out from under the CWB 
mandate.
17  
The major problem with a continental market is the transshipment problem. For 
example, a grain company could purchase malting barley in Canada, export it to the 
United States as feed barley, and re-export it into the international market in 
competition with the CWB. A similar problem exists with the creation of a continental 
wheat market. Some will see such competition as a good outcome; however, it does 
reduce the ability of the CWB to earn a price premium. 
A second option is to free up the domestic market for all commodities and let the 
single desk remain only with respect to exports. This option would transform the 
CWB into a marketing agency similar to the Australian model. The AWB has gone 
further and purchased grain assets both in Australia and in some importing countries. 
It has raised capital on the Australian stock market through a share offering.
18 Some 
say the AWB is preparing itself for the day it loses all single-desk selling authority. 
This second option has a number of attractive characteristics. First, the CWB, like 
the AWB, could purchase grain-handling assets. This may give it more leverage to 
capture price premiums from foreign consumers. Second, the CWB could be allowed 
to market other grain products for farmers, for example, canola and pulse crops, but 
without any single-desk selling authority. There are scope economies in the 
international grain trade, and the CWB (with a change to its act) could capture some 
new marketing opportunities. This arrangement would allow the CWB to become 
more engaged in the marketing of grains produced on the prairies if farmers found the 
agency’s performance to be competitive. 
Canada allows for the importation of milling wheat and malting barley. Given that 
milling wheat in Canada is priced off the Minneapolis exchange and malting barley is 
priced off the Pacific Northwest market, Canadian consumers are already paying U.S. 
prices. This means there would be no new arbitrage between the two markets if the 
domestic Canadian market were freed up. 
The Australian option would do little to appease the United States. The AWB is 
less of an annoyance to the Americans because it does not export into the U.S. market 
in the volumes the CWB does because of location and the types of products they 
produce. Canadian durum is one product which is in strong demand in the United 
States. The U.S. pasta makers purchase large quantities of Canadian durum wheat, in 
part because of the quality, and in the process these firms maintain good commercial 
relationships with the CWB.   W.H. Furtan 
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Recommendations 
hile this article is not at all exhaustive, I make three recommendations that the 
Government of Canada and the CWB may consider. 
Recommendation 1  
The CWB move away from its reliance on the federal government guarantee for the 
pool account by self-insuring the pool account. All pricing decisions would then be 
the sole responsibility of the CWB management and board of directors. 
Recommendation 2 
The CWB give up its single-desk selling powers in the domestic market in exchange 
for the ability to market all types of grains produced on the prairies. The single-desk 
selling powers would remain only for export wheat, durum and barley. 
Recommendation 3 
The CWB purchase grain-handling assets at an advantageous time that facilitates the 
maximizing of market returns to prairie grain farmers. This would move the CWB in 
the direction taken by the AWB. 
Conclusion 
he CWB is a complex entity. As the policies that govern the CWB are 
interrelated, it is difficult to change just one aspect, such as removing some of 
the selling powers. Such difficulties must not hinder the process of looking for 
alternatives and determining how they would affect prairie farmers and whether they 
would be more consistent with Canada’s national policy on free trade. Changes to 
some of the long-standing institutional structures are likely to be thrust upon farmers 
from a number of sources. It is time to have an open and constructive dialogue about 
possible changes to the CWB and their implications. 
W 
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1.   Price premiums are earned by the CWB’s ability to price discriminate in some 
international markets. 
2.   A marketing year goes from August 1
st of one year to July 31
st of the following 
year. Each year the CWB has pool accounts for wheat, durum, feed barley, and 
malting barley. 
3.   Without the single desk, farmers will potentially behave opportunistically in 
getting “in” and “out” of the price pool. See the section “Removal of all CWB 
single-desk selling authority” later in this article for a more detailed discussion. 
4.   The cost of CWB services varies from year to year depending upon the volume 
handled. The actual costs are reported each year in the annual report. Comparable 
marketing costs for large private grain trading firms are not publicly available. 
5.   Some reviewers question why the CWB could not enter into long-term marketing 
contracts (i.e., five-year contracts) with farmers and in such a manner guarantee 
the supply of grain. The major problem with this option is that it is difficult to 
take farmers to court if they break the contract. 
6.   Given that the pooled final price is an annual average, farmers can always identify 
days when they could market grain at a price above the seasonal average. Of 
course this is after the fact, but as the end of the marketing year approaches it does 
become easy to forecast the final pooled price.   W.H. Furtan 
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7.   The report is the Decision Adopted by the General Council on August 1, 2004 
(Ref: WT/L/579), which contains an Annex A – Framework for Establishing 
Modalities in Agriculture. 
8.   The government financing benefits received by the CWB are not discussed here in 
any detail. While they affect the cost structure of the CWB, they do not affect how 
the CWB interacts with farmers. 
9.   It is worth mentioning that at least two of the four wheat pool deficits were 
extraordinary events. The deficit in the 1980s was a direct result of the action by 
the U.S. government to challenge other wheat exporters through the Export 
Enhancement Program. The 1991 deficit resulted from what is considered a 
political decision by the Canadian government to set the initial payments at a level 
above the expected pool return. 
10.  In terms of lost revenues, the wheat tariff cost approximately 40 million dollars 
per year and has effectively stopped the U.S. importation of Canadian wheat. 
Rulings on the appeals are expected in the spring of 2005 (CWB, 2005). 
11.  It may be possible to shorten the pooling period, as is the case for barley, thus 
reducing the risk of a pool account deficit. 
12.  Since 1988 the U.S. loan program has paid out over $3.8 billion for wheat, 
whereas the CWB initial payment guarantee has paid out $85 million (CWB, 
2005). 
13.  This would not result in countervailing duties disappearing, but may convince 
U.S. farmers they are on an even footing with Canadian wheat producers. 
14.  The same effect occurred when the Federal Government made the BSE payment 
to farmers in 2004. The BSE payments were added to the farmer’s revenue, 
reducing the probability of a CAIS payment. 
15.  For details on what revenues and costs go into the “eligible net margin” and the 
government’s contribution to maintaining this revenue see the Agriculture and 
Agri-Food Canada website.  
16.  The Crow Benefit was a transportation subsidy paid by the federal government to 
prairie farmers on export grains. 
17.  The CWB does make a substantial premium for producers on the sale of malting 
barley (Schmitz et al., 1999). The malt market is separate from the feed market; 
the barley is fungible between the two end uses, thus making the opening up of 
the feed market problematic. 
18.  A full discussion of the transformation of the AWB is beyond the space limitation 
of this article. The Government of Australia has stated it will not make further 
changes to the mandate and structure of the AWB until after 2010. This appears to 
indicate support for the direction in which the AWB has moved.  
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